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  The importance of the post-merger status of the target chief executive officer (CEO) is 
illustrated by reports of a humorous exchange between two CEOs discussing the possible merger 
of their firms in 2003.  The CEO of Bank One, Jamie Dimon, called the CEO of JPMorgan 
Chase, William Harrison, with an offer to sell shortly after the Bank of America’s acquisition of 
FleetBoston at a 41 percent purchase premium was announced.
1  Mr. Dimon’s offer to Mr. 
Harrison was:  “Bill, at 40%, I'll drive your car.”  Mr. Harrison responded that “At 15%, you 
could be president.”  In the end, JPMorgan Chase acquired Bank One at a 14.5 percent purchase 
premium and Mr. Dimon became president of the combined firms with an understanding that he 
would become CEO two years after the merger completion date. 
  Given that the contracting is voluntary, target CEOs that contract with the acquirer are 
clearly benefiting from their post-merger deal.  While it is unlikely that any CEO of a public 
company would need to become a chauffer after the merger, target CEOs have a legitimate 
concern about the loss of their firm-specific human capital as a result of their company being 
acquired. 
  Similarly, acquiring firms benefit from voluntarily contracting with the target CEO.  The 
benefit may merely take the form of inducing the target CEO to acquiesce to the merger but it 
could provide even greater value to the acquirer.  As the exchange between Dimon and Harrison 
suggests, the target CEO could obtain a post-merger position at the expense of agreeing to a 
lower purchase premium.  The contract could also boost the value of the combined firms.  In the 
JP Morgan Chase case, some analysts specifically pointed to JP Morgan’s acquisition of 
Dimon’s talents as one of the benefits of the merger. Over the five-day period (two days before 
to two days after the merger announcement date) surrounding the merger announcement date, the   2
cumulative abnormal returns were negative 1.26%, positive 12.69%, and positive 4.28% for 
JPMorgan Chase, Bank One, and the combined firms, respectively.
2 
  While the target’s CEO and the acquirer clearly benefit from the contracting, what impact 
do these deals have on target shareholders returns?  Conditional on a merger occurring, a lower 
purchase premium obviously reduces their wealth.  Alternatively, if target CEO contracting is 
necessary for a takeover to occur then the contract might boost target shareholder wealth.   
Finally, if the contracting increases the post-merger value of the combined firms, the contracts 
should have a nonnegative impact on their wealth. 
  The focus of this study is on the impact of the target CEO’s post-merger position on the 
purchase premium and target shareholder abnormal returns around the announcement of the deal 
in a sample of bank mergers during the period 1990-2004.  Was the above exchange between 
Dimon and Harrison merely a humorous way to start a serious conversation?  Or does it convey 
an important insight as to the way that target and acquiring CEOs view the importance of the 
target CEO’s post-merger position?  In addition to examining the impact of contracting between 
the target CEO and the acquirer, this paper also examines the announcement period returns of the 
acquirer and the combined firms to look for evidence that the contracting boosts overall value of 
the merger or results in wealth transfers to the acquirer’s shareholders or both.   
The two studies most directly relevant for our study are Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack 
(2004) and Wulf (2004).  Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004) ask the question, “what is the 
benefit to the target CEO from consenting to the takeover?”
3  Their study analyzes 311 
transactions completed in the U.S. between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 1997.  They find 
that the target CEOs in their sample obtain a mean increase in wealth of $8 million to $11 
million.  While a large fraction of the target CEOs do not remain with the combined entity, the   3
target CEOs that become executives of the acquirer obtain smaller benefits.  Those remaining 
also experience unusually high turnover rates for several years.  The results from Hartzell, Ofek 
and Yermack (2004) provide marginally significant evidence that, in general, the gains to target 
shareholders are reduced when the target CEO obtains additional benefits from the merger 
(beyond those specified in his pre-merger employment contract with the target) but stronger 
evidence that target shareholders lose when the target CEO has below median ownership interest 
in the target. 
  Wulf (2004) focuses on the issue of whether target CEOs accept lower returns for target 
shareholders in order to obtain power in the post-merger firm.  In particular, she focuses on the 
abnormal returns associated with “mergers of equals” (MOEs) in which the two firms have 
approximately equal representation on the post-merger board over the period from January 1, 
1991 to December 31, 1999.  On average, the total gains as measured by abnormal returns are 
insignificantly different for her MOE and control samples.  However, the target shareholders 
obtain a smaller proportion of these gains when governance is shared with the target and when 
the target CEO obtains greater post-merger control rights (that is, when the target board of 
directors has an equal or controlling interest on the post-merger board of directors of the 
combined firms and the merger agreement stipulates that the target CEO will assume the CEO or 
Chairman position in the combined firms within some specified period after the merger 
completion date). 
  A possible limitation of these two studies that limits their ability to obtain stronger results 
is their use of data across a variety of industries.  The relationship between target returns and the 
post-merger role of the CEO may be obscured by a variety of factors including:  differences in 
average purchase premiums across industries, differences in the roles that target CEOs might   4
reasonably expect to take with acquirers across industries (including cases where the target and 
acquirer come from different industries) and cross-industry differences in governance structures. 
  This paper addresses the problems of the prior studies by focusing on a single industry, 
insured depositories (hereafter, banks).  The banking industry has several special features that 
make it of special interest in evaluating the impact of target CEO contracting.  First, it is one of 
the few industries with sufficient intra-industry mergers to provide a reasonable sample size.  
The relaxation of legal restrictions on bank mergers during the 1980s and 1990s, especially 
restrictions on mergers across state borders, produced a wave of takeovers within the industry.
4 
  Second, it is likely to be easier to detect in banking if target CEOs accept lower purchase 
premiums in return for a role in the post-merger firm.  Target CEOs’ ability to threaten to 
obstruct a takeover is limited by the potential acquirer’s ability to go directly to the target 
shareholders in a hostile takeover.  However, hostile takeovers are rarely undertaken and almost 
never successful in banking, in part because bank mergers are required to obtain prior approval 
from bank regulators.  Bank regulators are not necessarily opposed to hostile takeovers per se, 
but the regulatory approval process may take months, especially when the merger involves larger 
banks, which gives the target additional time to develop its defenses. 
  Third, if participation by the target CEO can boost the value of the combined firms this 
may also be easier to detect in bank mergers.  Banking is widely thought to be a “relationship” 
business.  If the target CEO can help in maintaining these relationships then his continued 
presence after the merger should be recognized by investors as boosting the overall value of the 
combined firms.   5
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section 1 we discuss our 
empirical model.  In Section 2 we describe our data.  In Section 3 we present our main results.  
The paper concludes with summary remarks in Section 4. 
1. Empirical  model 
  A takeover can result in gains to the shareholders of the two firms to the extent the value 
of the target to the acquirer exceeds its value as an independent firm.   The target’s incentive to 
require a larger share of these gains depends in part on the CEO’s power in the corporate 
governance structure and in part on the target CEO’s incentives to agree to the acquisition.  The 
CEO incentive to approve the deal arises both from factors outside and factors within the control 
of the acquirer.  This section discusses the empirical proxies for the value of target to the 
acquirer, target governance structure, and target CEO incentives used in the analysis. 
1.1 Shareholder  returns 
  We proxy the return to the target shareholders using three different measures:  (1) the 
purchase premium at announcement over the target’s stock price 40 trading days before the 
announcement, (2) the premium over the target’s stock price 20 trading days before the 
announcement, and (3) the cumulative abnormal returns during the window from two days 
before the announcement date to two days after the announcement date.  We also measure the 
returns to the acquirer and to the combination of the two firms with the cumulative abnormal 
returns during the window from two days before the announcement date to two days after the 
announcement date. 
Our measure of the abnormal returns associated with the merger announcement follows 
the event study based methodology used by Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988).  Specifically, we 
calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the event window [-2, +2] for targets,   6
acquirers, and the portfolio of targets and acquirers around the merger announcement date for 
our sample of firms.  For each firm i, under the assumption of multivariate normality, the market 
model is used to calculate abnormal return (ARi,t) for event day t as: 
 , ˆ ˆ , , , t m i i t i t i R R AR β α − − =  
where Ri,t = return to firm i on day t;  i α ˆ ,  i β ˆ = market model parameter estimates, and Rm,t = 
return to the value-weighted NYSE market portfolio on day t. The market model parameter 
estimates for each firm are obtained using a maximum of 240 trading days of daily returns data 
beginning 300 days before the first event.  The cumulative abnormal return (CARi,t) from event 
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The z-statistic is used to determine whether the abnormal returns are statistically significant. 
Daily and cumulative abnormal returns of the combined firms are computed using the procedure 
in Houston and Ryngaert (1994).   
1.2  Value of the Target to Acquirer 
The premium paid by the acquirer for a target depends on the difference between the 
value the acquirer places on control of the target versus the value the market places on owning a 
non-controlling interest in the firm.  The literature analyzing bank mergers uses a variety of 
variables to control for the difference in the value.  Most of the control variables used in the 
analysis are drawn from previous studies of bank mergers such as Benston, Hunter, and Wall 
(1995); Hadlock, Houston, and Ryngaert (1999); and Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001).   
The starting point for measuring the value of the target both as a stand-alone firm and in 
an acquisition are its current profitability and variability of profitability.  These are then   7
augmented with measures of the level and variability of the profitability of the acquirer as 
proxies for potential changes in the level and variability of target’s profitability.  Further, the 
covariability of the acquirer’s and target’s earnings is included to proxy for the extent to which 
the acquisition would increase or reduce the variability of the acquirer’s earnings.  Five variables 
representing the level, variance and covariance of the acquirers’ and targets’ return on assets are 
included as proxies as in Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995). The targets’ and acquirers’ return on 
assets over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement date are represented by ROAt and 
ROAa, respectively.  The variances of return on assets for the target and acquirer over the 13 
quarters prior to the quarter of the merger announcement date are represented by VROAt and 
VROAa, respectively.  The covariance of the returns on their assets is represented by COVt,a.   
Another important determinant of the value of the target is its likely growth rate after the 
merger.  A proxy for the expected growth in the target’s market is GTAt and a proxy for the 
influence of the acquirer on the growth rate is GTAa.  Both measures are calculated as the growth 
in the respective firm’s total assets over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement. 
The post-merger value of the combined firms also depends on the difficulty of merging 
the firms and the potential for cost savings.  The measure of the relative difficulty of absorbing 
the target into the acquirer is given by the variable Rel_asset.  Rel_asset measures the relative 
size of the two banks’ total assets and increases in its value are generally associated with smaller 
purchase premium to the target.  Bank mergers are more likely to generate cost savings when the 
two banks existing markets overlap.  The extent of overlap is proxied by the variable Instate, a 
binary variable that takes the value of one if the two banks are headquartered in the same state 
and zero otherwise.   8
Finally, year fixed effects are added to the equation.  Floegel, Gebken and Johanning 
(2005) find evidence across industries that abnormal returns around the announcements of 
mergers depends in part on whether the mergers are announced at the beginning or end of a 
merger wave.  The inclusion of annual fixed effects provides a control for any such merger wave 
dynamics as well as controlling any other effects due to the timing of the announcements. 
1.3  Target Governance 
Whether higher shareholder control increases or decreases takeover premiums depends 
on the strength of the firm’s takeover defenses and whether target CEOs negotiate for private 
benefits with the acquirer according to Moeller (2005).
5  If a firm’s takeover defenses are weak, 
as he argues was true in the 1980s, then lower shareholder control increases premium.  The 
reason is that shareholders could overcome management opposition to the takeover if they 
exerted sufficient effort but they must be incented to make such costly efforts by a high takeover 
premium. The size of the premium required depended on the cost of overcoming management.  
Greater shareholder control implied a lower cost of overcoming management, and hence a lower 
premium.  On the other hand, Moeller (2005) argues that if a firm has strong takeover controls 
that allow the manager to block the transaction then acquirers must induce the CEO to approve 
the deal by offering private benefits to the CEO.  In this case, a strong board limits these private 
benefits, with the result that the acquirer must pay more to complete the deal. 
Given that the requirement for prior supervisory approval of bank mergers acts as a 
merger defense and that most of the CEOs in our sample receive some benefit (as discussed in 
section 3.1 below), Moeller’s analysis would suggest that lower shareholder control should be 
associated with higher premiums for our sample.    9
Moeller includes both block shareholders and independent directors as measures of 
shareholder control.  Our measure for block shareholder effects is Blockholder, a binary variable 
that is equal to one if there is not a large independent block shareholder (share ownership of at 
least 5% by non-affiliated shareholders), and zero if such a blockholder exists.
6 The impact of 
independent directors is incorporated with the variable Indepdirectors, which is the percentage of 
directors who are not current or past employees of the bank, do not have substantial business or 
family ties with management (as indicated in the proxy statement), nor have business ties with 
the bank.   
1.4  CEO incentives outside the acquirer’s control 
The target CEO’s personal reservation price for accepting a takeover depends on both his 
perceived costs and benefits of losing his position.  One cost to the CEO of losing his position is 
the loss of his firm specific human capital.  Our proxy for the potential loss in firm-specific 
human capital is Years-To-Retire, where the potential loss is taken to be an increasing function of 
the remaining years until the CEO reaches retirement age.  As in Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack 
(2004), we define Years-To-Retire as 65 minus the CEO’s age if the CEO is less than 65 or zero 
if the CEO is 65 or older. 
On the other hand, the CEO may benefit from a takeover to the extent that he was given a 
change of control (or golden parachute) by the target prior to the takeover.  The indicator 
variable for a change of control provision, or golden parachutes, is HGolden.
7   
1.5  CEO incentives from the acquirer 
  The acquirer may incent the target’s CEO to support the merger in two ways:  offer a 
higher price which increases the value of the CEO’s ownership and contract with the CEO for a 
position in the combined firms after the merger.  To account for the managerial ownership effect,   10
we include the percent of the target’s shares owned by the CEO in our empirical specification as 
CEO Shares. 
  The target CEO may obtain a variety of positions with the acquiring firm, albeit we did 
not find any examples where the target CEO became a chauffer.  After the merger, the target 
CEO may obtain:  (1) an operating position, (2) a position on the combined firm’s board of 
directors, (3) a consulting position, and (4) no position at the combined firm.  We further 
subdivide the operating positions into three categories:   (1) the CEO of the combined firms, (2) 
the president or chief operating officer of the combined firms, or (3) another officer (typically the 
CEO of a subsidiary of the combined firms).  The positions on the combined firm’s board of 
directors were divided into another three categories: (1) the chairman of the board of directors, 
(2) the vice-chairman of the board, or (3) a director of the combined firms.  Our binary variables 
for the positions are labeled:  CEO, President, Other Officer, Chairman, Vice-Chair, Director, 
Consultant, and None.
 8  Our coding only assigns a value of one to the highest position obtained 
by the target CEO, the other positions take a value of zero.  We rank operating positions as 
higher than board positions and board positions as higher than consulting.  Thus, if the target 
CEO becomes CEO and chairman of the combined firm, only the variable CEO takes a value of 
1.  Similarly we only recognize the highest operating position so that if the target CEO becomes 
CEO and president of the combined firm, only the variable CEO takes a value of 1. 
2. Data 
  Our initial sample consists of the pair of target and acquirers identified from SNL’s 
database covering the period 1990-2004. We match this sample of firms against a banking 
organization mergers and acquisitions sample obtained from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
database. The SDC data includes offer prices for targets, announcement dates, and other   11
characteristics of the deal.  In several cases the announcement date reported in the SNL database 
was different from that reported in the SDC database. Because the SDC database is most 
commonly used, we base the announcement dates in our article on those reported in the SDC 
database.
9  Following Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004) we then reduced the sample to only 
those transactions where the market value of the target is at least 10 percent of the market value 
of the acquirer.
10  We also limit our sample to those targets whose total assets, as reported by 
SNL, prior to the merger announcement date exceed $1 billion. While the former criteria 
eliminates transactions that would unlikely have a material effect on the acquirer, the latter 
criteria excludes transactions involving targets who book of business would unlikely be 
substantial relative to other targets, avoiding extreme size disparities among targets that could 
generate results that have little, if anything, to do with the focus of our study.
11 We require that 
both the target and acquirer be publicly traded and listed on the Center for Research in Securities 
Prices (CRSP) database. We also eliminated transactions in which the target or acquirer was a 
foreign banking organization. We are interested in the acquiring, the target, and a portfolio of 
both firms after the deal is completed. For each of our merger transactions, we use Proxy 
Statements, Form 10-K or a similar document to obtain share ownership, compensation, CEO 
age, board composition, and golden parachute (GP) information of the targets before the 
acquisition announcement date. We use Security Exchange Commission Form S-4 to obtain 
post-merger employment contracts (the appendix provides a summary of the key elements in the 
post-merger employment contracts between the target CEO and the acquiring firm for three of 
the transactions in our sample). Imposing our selection criteria on the SNL-matched-SDC 
samples resulted in a sample of 162 completed transactions covering the period 1990-2004.   12
   Daily share prices for both target and acquirers are obtained from the CRSP file. The 
stock market index employed in our event study is the value-weighted portfolio (NYSE and 
AMEX) obtained from the CRSP database.  Accounting data is obtained from the FR-Y9C 
reports of income and condition filed by bank holding companies with the Federal Reserve and 
the Thrift Financial Report reports filed by thrifts with the Office of Thrift Supervision. 
3. Empirical  Results 
3.1 Descriptive  Statistics   
  Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample of 162 mergers.  The median market 
capitalization of the acquirer is $2.0 billion and that of the target is $0.5 billion.  The median 
ratio of target assets to the acquirer’s assets is 0.355.  Acquirers reported higher return on asset 
(ROA) and asset growth rates than the targets.
12  Target shareholders received a mean purchase 
premium of over 30 percent above the target’s stock price measured over both 20 and 40 trading 
days prior to the announcement of the deal. 
  The CEO characteristics given in Table 2 show that median share ownership by the target 
CEO prior to the merger is 1.03 percent.  The median CEO is about 56 years old.  Almost 70 
percent of the target CEOs are also the chairman of their boards of directors but over 70 percent 
of their boards consist of independent directors.  Slightly less than one-half of the firms in the 
sample had no independent blockholder. 
  Table 3 documents the ways in which the typical CEO in our sample gained from the 
takeover.  Over 95 percent of the CEOs had a change of control agreement with the target firm 
and we could confirm that the CEO received this change of control in over one-half of the cases.  
The golden parachute frequency in our paper is substantially higher than that found in other   13
studies (Cotter and Zenner, 1994; Subramaniam and Daley, 2000; and Lefanowicz, Robinson, 
and Smith, 2000). 
  Panel B of Table 3 shows the personal benefits obtained by the CEO from the acquiring 
firm.  The top part of panel B gives the highest position obtained by the CEO in the combined 
firms.  The CEO obtained an operating position with the post-merger firm in over one-third of 
the mergers, with little over 3 percent of the target CEO’s becoming CEO of the new firm.  The 
CEO did not have a relationship with the post-merger firm in about 17 percent of the mergers.  
We could confirm that about 45 percent remained as officers at the time of the first proxy after 
the merger and over 60 percent remained as directors.  These figures contrast with substantially 
higher attrition rates in the Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004) where only 34 percent remained 
as officers and only 43 percent remained as directors.  The CEO also obtained a golden 
parachute for a change in control of the post-merger firm in over 50 percent of our sample 
transactions. 
  The abnormal returns around the merger announcement date are provided in Table 4.  
The announcement period abnormal returns to target shareholders are a highly significant 13.44 
percent over the event window [-2, +2].  Acquirer returns are a significantly negative 3.39 
percent.  However, a value weighted combination of the two firms produced positive and 
significant abnormal returns of 0.50 percent.  
3.2  CEO Contracting and Target Shareholder Returns  
  The impact of CEO contracting on target shareholder returns is analyzed in Table 5.  
Most of the coefficients on the control variables are statistically insignificant.  The only 
coefficients on the return variables that are significant are the coefficients on the covariance of 
the two firm’s return on assets, COVt,a in the purchase premium equations and the coefficient on   14
the variance of the acquirers’ return on assets, VROAa, in the target abnormal return equation. 
The two coefficients on the covariance term are significantly negative at the 10 percent level or 
better, while that on the variance term is positive and significant at the 5 percent level.  The 
covariance results are consistent with acquirers paying more for mergers that diversify the 
combined firm’s risk.  The coefficient on the variance term in the target abnormal return 
equation suggests that there is a greater stock market reaction to those mergers in which the 
acquirer is, on average, relatively more risky. The above two results are consistent with risky 
acquirers being willing to pay more because they anticipate being able to integrate the target’s 
franchise into their operations to diversify the combined firms book of assets. 
  All three of the coefficients on the CEO having a golden parachute, HGolden, are 
negative and two are significantly negative at the 1 percent level.   All three of the coefficients 
on the binary variable indicating the absence of an independent blockholder, Blockholder, are 
positive and highly significantly (better than 5 percent).  These findings are inconsistent with 
Moeller’s (2005) results.
13  Instead, these results are consistent with target CEOs demanding 
excessively high purchase premiums in the absence of outside blockholders that are able to force 
acceptance of the takeover despite CEO opposition or the CEO receiving a golden parachute that 
at least partially compensates him for the loss of his position. 
  The coefficients on the position obtained by the CEO in the post-merger firm is negative 
for 18 of the 21 coefficients (3 measures of returns times 7 different positions), including 8 of 9 
coefficients on the operating position variables, CEO, President, Other Officer.  The three 
coefficients on CEO,  the target CEO becoming the CEO of the combined firms, and the three 
coefficients on Other officer, the target CEO becoming a non-top executive officer of the 
combined firms, are individually significant (at the 10 percent level or better).  So is the   15
coefficient on Director for the equation estimating purchase price premium measured over 20 
trading days.  An F-test for the three operating positions rejects the hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the three operating positions variables are equal to zero at the 10 percent level or 
better in the two purchase price premium equations.  The F-test for the three board positions 
(Chairman, Vice-Chair, and Director) are all insignificant at conventional levels.     
  Thus, our analysis of the returns to target shareholders suggests that, conditional on a 
takeover offer being made, that target shareholders receive a smaller premium when their CEO 
obtains an operating position with the acquiring firm.  Not only is this reduction in target 
shareholder return statistically significant in most cases, the differences are also economically 
large.
14 
3.3  Impact of Contracting On the Distribution and Amount of Gains   
  The acquirer may contract with the target CEO to transfer wealth or to boost the overall 
value of the transaction or both.  The evidence from target returns is that the contracting serves to 
reduce the purchase premium obtained by target shareholders in completed takeovers.  This 
subsection analyzes acquirer returns to determine whether the contracting increases the overall 
value of the deal and whether it results in significant gains to acquirer shareholders.  
  The analysis of the abnormal returns associated with the acquirer and combined firm are 
presented in Table 6, as is a copy of the analysis of the abnormal returns for the target from 
Table 5 for comparison purposes.  None of the coefficients on the return variables are significant 
in either the acquirer or combined abnormal returns.  The acquirer’s abnormal returns and the 
combined abnormal returns are significantly negatively related to the acquirer’s growth rate, 
GTAa, while the premiums paid to targets are unaffected by how fast the acquirer is growing.  
The significantly negative coefficient in the acquirers’ abnormal return equation is consistent   16
with faster growing acquirers either overpaying for targets or not being as efficient in post-
merger operations.  The significantly negative coefficient in the combined returns equation 
combined with the insignificance of the coefficient on the targets both suggest that the negative 
acquirer’s returns are due to problems with post-merger operations and not with overpaying for 
the target.    The coefficient on the target’s growth rate, GTAt, is significantly positive.  The 
coefficient on the relative asset sizes of the two firms is significantly positive (at the 1 percent 
level) in explaining the combined abnormal returns, suggesting that relatively larger targets 
generally produce higher total wealth changes.  This finding is not consistent with practitioner 
discussions suggesting that relatively larger firms are more difficult to integrate. 
  None of the coefficients on the target governance variables are significant in the 
equations for the acquirer’s and combined abnormal returns.  This stands in contrast to the 
consistently significantly positive coefficients on the blockholder variable in the target premiums 
and abnormal returns equations.  The lack of significance of the coefficient on the blockholder 
variable in the acquirer’s equation is consistent with blockholders inducing targets to accept fair 
offers from acquirers even if the offers do not meet the target CEO’s reservation price. 
  One of the coefficients on CEO incentives outside the acquirer’s control are significant at 
the 10 percent level: the coefficient on the CEO having a golden parachute, HGolden, in the 
combined returns equation is significantly negative.  These results suggest that there are smaller 
wealth effects for both target and acquirer shareholders in those transactions where the target 
CEO had a golden parachute relative to those transactions where the CEO does not have a golden 
parachute prior to the announcement date.   
  Only one of the coefficients on the post-merger position variables is significant, the 
variable  Chairman is significant at the 10 percent level in the combined abnormal returns   17
equation.  The only significant F-test is that of the board roles in the acquirer’s return equation, 
which is significant at the 10 percent level. One interpretation of these results is that acquirers 
that offer target CEOs the positions of Chair or Vice-Chair tend to overpay in these acquisitions.  
However, if this interpretation were correct the coefficients on Chairman and Vice-Chair in the 
premium and target’s returns equation should be significantly positive but they are insignificant 
and generally negative.  Another interpretation is that acquirers that are willing to give the 
position of board Chairman or Vice-Chair are sending an adverse signal about the extent to 
which their board actually monitors their CEO. 
  Overall, the results from the estimation of the post-merger position variables in the 
various premium and abnormal return equations is most consistent with the hypothesis that the 
primary benefit of the target CEO receiving a post-merger position is that it offsets the incentives 
he would otherwise have to oppose  a takeover bid.  
3.4 Robustness  tests 
  In addition to our primary results, we performed a variety of robustness tests.  We (1) 
added a binary variable equal to one if the target CEO was also the chairman of the target’s 
board, (2) added two binary variables to distinguish whether the target or the acquirer were 
commercial banks (or bank holding companies) versus thrifts (or thrift holding companies, (3) 
substituted the dollar amount of the target CEO’s share ownership for his percentage ownership, 
and (4) included a binary variable equal to one if SNL coded the deal as a stock transaction.
15   
Finally we used the SNL announcement dates rather than the SDC announcement dates.  The 
difference in the two is that SNL dates correspond to the actual announcement whereas some of 
the SDC dates reflect earlier strong rumors of a deal.   18
  Although the details vary based on the exact specification, the overall results are 
generally similar to those presented in Tables 5 and 6.  Significantly, the most important results 
are essentially unchanged, albeit some coefficients that are borderline significant in Tables 5 and 
6 become borderline insignificant in some alternative specifications.  The only consistently 
significant variable on the target CEO’s post-merger role is for the target CEO becoming CEO of 
the post-merger firm, CEO.  The variable CEO is significantly negative for all three measures of 
target shareholder returns, but insignificant for the acquirer’s announcement abnormal returns, 
and the combined returns of the target and the acquirer.  Further, the coefficients on the variables 
for the target CEO also being chair of the target’s board, the binary variables for commercial 
bank versus thrift status, the variable for the dollar value of shares and for a stock takeover are 
consistently insignificant.  
  When we use SNL announcement dates rather than the SDC announcement dates, the 
results are slightly weaker, although the direction of impact is similar. In particular, the variable 
CEO is negative in all three of the target shareholders’ return equations, but only significant in 
the two premium equations. All three of the coefficients on the binary variable indicating the 
absence of an independent blockholder, Blockholder, are positive and statistically significant 
(two of the coefficients at better than 1 percent and the third at the 10 percent level). As before, 
none of the coefficients on the post-merger position variables are significant in either the 
acquirer’s abnormal returns or the combined firms’ abnormal returns equations.  
4. Conclusion 
  Mr. Dimon’s and Mr. Harrison’s joking about the tradeoff between the target CEO’s 
post-merger position and the returns to the target shareholders in completed mergers appears to 
have some basis in reality.  We find evidence that target shareholders receive a lower rate of   19
return when their CEO takes a position with the acquirer, especially if that position is that of 
CEO of the combined firms.  The lower returns received by target shareholders could be due to 
their CEO agreeing to sell the firm at a lowball price that transfers wealth to the acquirer’s 
shareholders.  Alternatively, the positions may merely compensating target CEOs for any loss of 
firm specific human capital and control rents they would have received had the target remained 
independent.  In terms of the Mr. Dimon and Mr. Harrison story, is the 40 percent asked by Mr. 
Dimon too high a price for JPMorgan Chase to offer?  Or is the 15 percent offered by Mr. 
Harrison a lowball offer that would take wealth from the target’s shareholders?  Our evidence 
from a sample of bank mergers suggests the problem is that the 40 percent asked by Mr. Dimon 
is too high. 
  The most direct evidence on the question of too high an ask price or too low of a bid 
comes from the insignificant impact of these positions on acquirer’s announcement returns.  If 
the target CEO obtaining a post-merger position were permitting acquirers to make lowball bids 
then we should observe significantly positive announcement returns for the acquirer.  However, 
these returns are insignificant. 
  Two additional pieces of evidence are consistent with target CEOs sometimes demanding 
excessive takeover premiums to compensate them for the loss of their human capital and control 
rents.  First, the target CEO’s support for a takeover may be less important if the target has a 
blockholder, who has both the incentive to monitor the firm and, likely, an important say in the 
firm’s governance.    We find that banks that have a significant blockholder also have lower 
takeover premiums and lower event returns.  Second, another way to at least partially 
compensate the CEO for the loss of his position is to give him a golden parachute.  We find that   20
target shareholder abnormal returns are significantly lower if the target CEO has a golden 
parachute.   
  Finally, it is possible that target CEOs were offered positions because they add value to 
the overall deal.  However, we find no evidence in support of this hypothesis.  The only 
significant coefficient on a CEO’s post-merger position is a negative coefficient on the CEO 
becoming chairman of the combined organization.   21
APPENDIX – Description of three post-merger employment agreements 
 
Target: Keystone Financial, Inc. 
Acquirer: M&T Bank Corp 
Announcement Date: May 17, 2000. 
 
Target CEO: Carl L. Campbell 
 
Source: M&T Bank Corp S-4 filed with SEC on Jun 30, 2000. 
 
  The term of Mr. Campbell's employment agreement begins on the effective date of the merger 
and expires on the third anniversary of that date. Pursuant to Mr. Campbell's employment agreement, Mr. 
Campbell will serve as Vice Chairman of M&T and as Chairman of M&T's Pennsylvania operations. 
During the employment period, Mr. Campbell will serve as a member of M&T's board of directors. 
Following the termination of this three-year period and until his 65th birthday, Mr. Campbell will 
continue employment on a part-time basis on terms to be agreed to between him and M&T. 
  Under Mr. Campbell's employment agreement, for each year during the initial three-year 
employment period, he will receive (1) an annual base salary no less than $460,000, and (2) an annual 
cash bonus of no less than $168,505. During the part-time employment period, he will receive an annual 
base salary of $400,000. If Mr. Campbell dies before his 65th birthday, 50% of the annual base salary he 
would have otherwise received during the remainder of the part-time employment period will be paid to 
his current spouse, if she survives him. 
  Upon completion of the merger, M&T will grant Mr. Campbell an option to acquire 50,000 
shares of M&T's common stock (on a post-split basis) which will vest in three equal installments on each 
of the first, second and third anniversaries of the completion of the merger (or, if earlier, upon the 
occurrence of a change of control of M&T) and will have a term of ten years from the date of grant   22
without regard to Mr. Campbell's earlier termination of employment. Mr. Campbell will also receive upon 
completion of the merger a lump sum payment of $1,250,000 (provided he is employed on such date). 
  Mr. Campbell's employment agreement provides for a lifetime annual retirement benefit of 
$350,000, less any amounts payable under qualified and non-qualified defined benefit retirement plans, 
commencing upon his 65
th birthday. Upon the death of Mr. Campbell, his current spouse, if she survives 
him, will receive an annual benefit for the rest of her life in an amount equal to 50% of this retirement 
benefit. During the initial three-year employment period, Mr. Campbell will be entitled to participate in 
all employee benefit, welfare and other plans, practices, policies and programs that apply generally to 
senior executives of M&T on a basis no less favorable than that provided to those executives, except that 
if Mr. Campbell's employment is terminated for any reason other than for cause by M&T, M&T will 
continue to provide him and his current spouse with medical and dental benefits for the remainder of their 
lives on a basis no less favorable than that on which those benefits were provided immediately before the 
termination. The employment agreement contains confidentiality, non-competition and non-solicitation 
provisions that apply while Mr. Campbell is employed and for specified periods thereafter. 
  In the event that Mr. Campbell's employment is terminated prior to the end of the initial three-
year employment period by M&T other than for "cause" or "disability" or by Mr. Campbell for "good 
reason" (each as defined in Mr. Campbell's employment agreement), Mr. Campbell will be entitled to 
receive the following payments and benefits: 
     - Annual base salary through the date of termination and a pro-rata annual bonus through the date of 
termination (based on the minimum annual bonus under the employment agreement); 
     - A lump sum payment equal to the product of (1) the number of months and portions thereof from the 
date of termination until the end of the initial three-year employment period, divided by 12, and (2) the 
sum of Mr. Campbell's annual base salary and the minimum annual bonus; 
     - The retirement benefit described above, payable in accordance with the terms of the employment 
agreement; 
     - A lump sum payment of $2 million; and   23
     - The stock options granted to Mr. Campbell, as described above, will vest immediately. 
 
Target: CoreStates Financial Corp 
Acquirer: First Union Corp (FUNC) 
Announcement Date: Nov. 18, 1997 
 
Target CEO: Terrence A. Larsen 
 
Source: First Union Corp S-4 filed with SEC on Jan. 1, 1998. 
 
       In connection with the execution of the Merger Agreement, FUNC entered into a five-year 
Employment Agreement with Terrence A. Larsen, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of CFC, which 
will become effective as of the Effective Date. The Employment Agreement provides, among other 
things, for Mr. Larsen to receive an annual salary of not less than $1,000,000 and a combined annual 
salary and bonus of not less than $2,500,000. The Employment Agreement provides for an increase in Mr. 
Larsen's base salary over his current base salary with CFC and may result in an increase in the amount of 
his annual bonus. The Employment Agreement also provides that if Mr. Larsen's employment is 
terminated by FUNC before expiration of the term of the Employment Agreement or if Mr. Larsen 
voluntarily terminates his employment with FUNC at any time or if he dies, becomes disabled or retires 
before expiration of the term of the Employment Agreement, he (or his estate, if he were to die) will 
receive $2,500,000 per year until the expiration of the term of the Employment Agreement. Upon 
expiration of the term of the Employment Agreement, Mr. Larsen (or his current spouse, if he is not then 
living) is guaranteed an annual retirement income of $1,000,000 (which he may, under certain 
circumstances, elect to receive as a lump sum), offset by certain retirement benefits under plans of 
predecessor employers and social security benefits. Mr. Larsen will also receive 100,000 shares of 
restricted FUNC Common Stock and options to purchase 200,000 shares of FUNC Common Stock upon   24
consummation of the Merger and in the calendar year following the calendar year in which such 
consummation occurs. In addition, FUNC would provide a split-dollar life insurance policy with a total 
death benefit of $20,000,000, $15,000,000 of which would be payable to Mr. Larsen's designated 
beneficiary, and the remaining $5,000,000 of which would be payable to FUNC. The Employment 
Agreement also provides for certain payments, notwithstanding termination of employment, and 
associated gross-up payments for taxes. Mr. Larsen's Employment Agreement shall supersede his 
termination of employment agreement with CFC upon consummation of the Merger. FUNC has agreed 




Target: OSB Financial Corp. 
Acquirer: FCB Financial Corp 
Announcement Date: Nov. 14, 1996 
 
Target CEO: James J. Rothenbach 
 
Source: FCB Financial Corp S-4 filed with SEC on Mar 12, 1997. 
 
 
    THIS EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is entered into this ____ day of 
_____, 1997 between FCB Financial Corp., a Wisconsin corporation (the "Company"), Fox Cities Bank, 
F.S.B., a federal savings bank which is wholly-owned by the Company (the "Bank") and James J. 
Rothenbach (the "Executive"). 
  The Bank hereby employs Executive for an initial period of three (3) years commencing on 
_______, 1997 (the "Commencement Date") and terminating on ________, 2000 (the "Initial Termination   25
Date"), subject to earlier termination as provided in Article II hereof.  The Board of Directors of the Bank 
shall review and may extend the term of this Agreement for a period of one (1) additional year beginning 
on the Initial Termination Date and in each subsequent year thereafter for a period of one (1) additional 
year.  Any extensions of the term of this Agreement shall be made by giving Executive written notice of 
such extension at least 90 days prior to the Initial Termination Date or the expiration of any renewal 
period.  Reference herein to the term of this Agreement shall refer to both the initial term and such 
extended terms. 
  The Bank agrees to compensate, and the Company agrees to cause the Bank to compensate, the 
Executive for his services hereunder during the term of this Agreement by payment of a salary at the 
annual rate of $150,000 in such monthly, semi-monthly or other payments as are from time to time 
applicable to other executive officers of the Bank.  The Executive's salary may be increased from time to 
time during the term of this Agreement in the sole discretion of the Board of Directors of the Bank, but 
Executive's salary shall not be reduced below the level then in effect.  In addition, Executive shall be 
entitled to participate in incentive compensation plans as may from time to time be established by the 
Company or the Bank on an equivalent basis as other executive officers of the Company or the Bank (but 
recognizing differences in responsibilities among executive officers). 
  If, at any time after the date hereof, a "Change in Control" (as hereinafter defined) occurs and 
within eighteen (18) months thereafter Executive's appointment as President or as Chief Executive Officer 
of the Company or his employment as President or as Chief Executive Officer of the Bank is involuntarily 
terminated (other than for Just Cause pursuant to Section 2.4) then the Executive shall be entitled to the 
benefits provided below. 
  The Company shall promptly pay, or cause the Bank to pay,   to the Executive an amount equal to 
the product of 2.00 times the   Executive's "base amount" as defined in Section 280G(b)(3) of the Code   
(such "base amount" to be derived from Executive's compensation paid by   the Company and the Bank).   26
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Endnotes 
 
1 This story comes from Moyer (2004) and is based on comments Mr. Dimon made to Bank One employees after the 
JPMorgan Chase/Bank One merger agreement was announced. 
 
2 The Z-statistics testing the hypothesis that the cumulative abnormal returns are equal to zero are -0.57, 7.00, and 
2.87, respectively. 
 
3 A number of studies examine bank mergers from a variety of perspectives.  Among the more recent studies are 
Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995); Bliss and Rosen (2001); Brewer, Jackson, and Jagtiani (2000); Brook, 
Hendershott, and Lee (1998); Hadlock, Houston, and Ryngaert (1999); and Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001). 
 
4 Bank mergers and acquisitions, including those involving banks that are not publicly traded, averaged 345 per year 
over the 1980-1989 period and 510 per year over the 1990-1999 period according to Brewer, Jackson, and Jagtiani 
(2000). 
 
5 An alternative hypothesis from Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2005) is that the presence of a blockholder may lead 
to a higher bid.  The primary limitation in applying their model to our sample is that their model deals with tender 
offers for at least 50 percent of the shares in the firm, thus, in their model the target’s CEO plays no important role 
in the takeover.  In contrast, almost all bank takeovers are negotiated deals for 100 percent of the target’s shares.  
The negotiation process potentially provides the target CEO with an opportunity to influence the outcome of the 
negotiations in ways that increase his utility at the expense of the target’s shareholders. 
 
6 Previous research finds that affiliated and independent block shareholders can have an impact on corporate control 
decisions.  Affiliated block shareholders tend to acquiesce with management while independent shareholders may 
facilitate control changes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Barclay and Holderness, 1991). 
7 The role of golden parachutes in modifying target CEO’s incentives is discussed in Jensen (1988) and Lambert and 
Larcker (1985), Harris (1990), Shmanske and Kahn (1995), and Almazan and Suarez (2003). 
 
8 Hartzell et al. combined the CEO, chair and vice-chair positions into a single variable.  We split CEO out as a 
separate variable in part because a target CEO may view having the top position as more important.  Moreover, in 
order for the target CEO to become CEO of the combined firm the acquiring CEO must take a different position.  In 
return for giving up his position of power, the CEO of the acquiring firm may demand extra compensation for his 
shareholders in the form of a lower takeover return to target shareholders.  Finally, if the combined value of the two 
firms is enhanced when the target CEO remains, this benefit may be largest when the target CEO remains as CEO of 
the combined firms. 
 
9 As discussed below, we re-ran the empirical specification using the announcement dates from SNL, and the results 
were qualitatively similar to those using announcement dates from SDC. 
 
10 The sample in Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack  (2004, p. 41) is limited to observations where the target lies in the 
range of 10% to 1000% of the acquirer to “rule out transactions where the target CEO would have little bargaining 
power.”  Their cutoff of 1000% does not exclude any transactions in our sample. 
 
11 We also use $1 billion in assets as the cutoff level because, in part, DeYoung and Hunter (2003) use it to separate 
large and mid-sized banking organizations from smaller community banks, and because Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
(2005) find that corporate governance rules enhance firm value more in larger firms than in smaller ones as these 
rules are both less costly and more beneficial in larger firms. 
 
12 The maximum growth rate for the acquirer of 1991.3% reflects the rapid growth of a small acquirer, starting with 
under $50 million in assets.  As explained below, in order to determine whether our results were being driven by 
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outliers we re-estimated the model dropping all acquisitions where the target or acquirer grew by more than 100% 
during the 13 month period prior to the takeover.  We obtained similar qualitative results.  
13 The definitions of both shareholder control variables, Indepdirectors and Blockholder, varies from those used by 
Moeller (2005) but our basic results hold with his definitions.  Moeller uses a binary variable equal to 1 if inside 
directors constitute 40 percent or more of the target’s shareholders.  Our coefficient on inside directors has the same 
sign but is statistically insignificant when premium is estimated over a 40 day period and for the abnormal return.  
Additionally, the coefficient on inside directors has the opposite sign when premium is measured over 20 days.  
 
Moeller uses a 10 percent cutoff rather than a 5 percent cutoff for blockholder control.  We obtain the same sign but 
reduced significance levels when our model is estimated with a 10 percent cutoff for the Blockholder binary 
variable.  We further tried to replicate Moeller’s results using our base model with his blockholder variable and 
without our variables for the CEO’s role (CEO, President, ...).  The coefficient on the blockholder variable remains 
the same (the opposite of his sign) and it is statistically significant. 
 
Although we could not identify the source of the difference in our results, there are several potentially important 
differences in our samples.  One is that Moeller (2005) uses a cross-industry sample of non-financial firms during 
the 1990s whereas we use a sample of banking firms drawn from the period 1990-2004.  Another possible 
explanation for the differences in results is that Moeller (2005) requires the market value of the target to at least 
equal 5 percent of the acquirer’s whereas we use a 10 percent cutoff.  In our preliminary data gathering efforts we 
found that the frequency of target CEOs receiving a post-merger position declined dramatically when the acquirer 
was less than 10 percent of the target, perhaps because the responsibility CEO of such a relatively small target 
would be more comparable to the acquirer’s regional managers than to the acquirer’s senior management or 
someone sitting on the acquirer’s board. 
 
14 Indeed, the coefficients on CEO are larger in absolute value in the two purchase price premium equations than are 
the premiums.  However, the differences are not statistically significantly different from zero. 
 
15 Stock is the medium of exchange in a clear majority of the deals in our sample, perhaps because bank supervisors 
will not approve takeovers that result in the bank failing minimum capital standards.  .     
Table 1. Descriptive characteristics for 162 bank acquisitions announced during the period 1990-
2004 
  Asset size is measured by the book value of assets for the quarter before the merger announcement.  The 
market value of equity is measured twenty days before the merger announcement and equals the number of 
shares outstanding times the price per share of common stock.  ROAa and ROAt are average quarterly 
return on assets for the acquirer and target, respectively.  Average quarterly return on assets is computed as 
the mean of the ratio of net income divided by total assets for the thirteen quarters preceding the merger 
announcement quarter.  GTAa is the growth rate of the acquirer’s total assets over the 13 quarters prior to 
the merger announcement.  GTAt is the growth rate of the target’s total assets over the 13 quarters prior to 
the merger announcement.  The asset growth rate is the arithmetic mean.  PREM20 is the premium of 
purchase price at the time of the announcement over the target’s share price 20 days before the 
announcement.  PREM40 is the premium of purchase price at the time of the announcement over the 
target’s share price 40 days before the announcement.  
  
 All  Deals 
Characteristics Mean Median  Maximum
Acquirer total assets prior to offer (Million)   $       44,917  $       13,828   $       770,912 
Target total assets prior to offer (Million)  $       19,402  $         3,762   $       326,563 
Acquirer value prior to offer   (Million)  $         7,200  $         1,960   $       117,790 
Target value prior  to offer  (Million)  $         2,986  $             507   $         57,038 
Target value/ Acquirer value  0.406 0.324  1.519
Target assets / Acquirer assets  0.504 0.355  1.763
ROA a 0.248% 0.268%  0.503%
ROA t 0.212% 0.233%  0.543%
GTAa 59.16% 8.33%  1991.30%
GTAt 17.99% 3.42%  213.38%
PREM20 0.312 0.287  1.249
PREM40 0.352 0.311  1.355
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Table 2. Characteristics of CEOs of 162 target companies used in the empirical analysis 
 
This table reports selected descriptive statistics about the ownership, compensation, and other 
characteristics of CEO of target companies.  Information about the target CEOs and their firms is obtained 
from proxy statements filed during the year before the merger announcement date.  The CEO is also 
chairman binary variable equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors. 
 
Characteristics Mean Median Max  Obs.
CEO shares/shares outstanding (percent)  1.70% 1.03% 10.80%  162
CEO total options/shares outstanding (percent)  1.14% 0.73% 4.68%  145
CEO salary prior to acquisition  $      470,356  $      400,000   $  1,000,000  157
CEO bonus prior to acquisition  $      432,354  $      179,750   $  4,910,075  154
CEO age  55.93 56.5 74  162
CEO tenure  19.794 19.600 45.000  146
CEO is also chairman binary  0.741 1 1  162
Independent directors  73.78% 77.098 93.75%  162
No independent blockholders binary variable   0.488 1 1  162
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Table 3. Selected gains received by target CEOs for the 162 transactions 
 
This table reports employment contracts and governance considerations obtained by the CEOs of target 
companies.  Pre-merger employment contract are based on information from the target company’s last 
proxy statement filed prior to the announcement date. Post-merger employment contract are based on 
information from Form S-4 filed by the acquirer company around the merger announcement date. 
Information on the status of target CEOs who become officers and directors of the acquirer is obtained 




Panel A: Pre-merger employment contracts 
        
Variable Mean Median Max  Obs.
Parachute binary variable  0.981481 1 1  162
Parachute   $   2,841,409  $   1,680,550 $  29,550,375  161
Received parachute binary variable  0.555 1 1  155
Parachute received  $   2,272,610  $   1,524,000  $   9,470,000  45
        
 
 
Panel B: Post-merger employment contracts 
        
Variable Mean  Median  Max  Obs. 
Stayed 82.71%  0  1  162 
  Operating position  33.96%  0  1  162 
         a.  CEO  3.09%  0  1  162 
         b. President  9.26%  0  1  162 
         c. Other Officer  21.61%  0  1  162 
  Board position  41.97%  0  1  162 
         a. Chairman  14.20%  0  1  162 
         b. Vice-Chair  14.81%  0  1  162 
         c. Director  12.96%  0  1  162 
   Consultant  6.79%  0  1  162 
No relationship  17.28%  0  1  162 
        
CEO remains as officer after next proxy  0.4654  0  1  159 
CEO remains as director after next proxy  0.6038  1  1  159 
Parachute binary variable  0.5312  1  1  160 




   33
Table 4. Announcement period abnormal returns and combined valuation changes for 162 banking 
organizations’ acquisitions announced during the period 1990-2004 
 
   This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the event window [-2, +2] for 
targets, acquirers, and portfolio of targets and acquirers around the merger announcement date over the 
period 1990-2004 for our sample of 162 large banking organizations transactions.  We use standard event 
study methodology to compute abnormal return (ARi,t) for event day t.  See Bradley, Desai, and Kim 
(1988) for a discussion of this methodology.  Following Houston and Ryngaert (1994), we define portfolio 
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where MVT,-20 is the market value of the target firm twenty days before the merger bid for the target, MVA,-
20 is the market value of the acquirer firm twenty days before the merger bid for the target.   The variance of 
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where ρA,T, is the estimated correlation coefficient between acquirer and target market model residuals 
obtained over the estimation period, 
i A n is the number of days in the acquirer abnormal return window, and 
i T n is the number of days in the target abnormal return window.   
  The valuation change is computed by taking the abnormal return to the target multiplied by the 
target’s market value twenty days before the merger announcement date and adding to it the abnormal 
return to the acquirer multiplied by the acquirer’s market value twenty days before the merger 




 Mean  Median  Min  Max  Obs. 
Valuation change (millions)  -$15.7  $10.8  -$5,370.0  $5,302.7  162 
 
Target abnormal returns    13.44   
(Z-statistic)   (39.61)   
 
Acquirer abnormal returns    −3.39  
(Z-statistic)   (−12.02)  
 
Combined abnormal returns    0.50   
(Z-statistic)   (3.18)     34
Table 5. Estimation of Target Shareholder Returns 
 
The three proxies for target shareholder returns are PREM20 = the premium of purchase price at the time of 
the announcement over the target’s share price 20 days before the announcement, PREM40 = the premium 
of purchase price at the time of the announcement over the target’s share price 40 days before the 
announcement, and T_Car = the target’s five-day cumulative abnormal returns over the [-2, +2] window.  
The independent variables are: ROAt = mean return on assets of target over the 13 quarters prior to the 
quarter of the merger announcement date; ROAa = mean return on assets of acquirer over the 13 quarters 
prior to the quarter of the merger announcement date; VROAt = the variance of the return on assets of the 
target using 13 quarters of data ending with the quarter prior to the merger announcement; VROAa = the 
variance of the return on assets of the acquirer using 13 quarters of data ending with the quarter prior to the 
merger announcement; COVt,a = the covariance of the target’s and acquirer’s return on assets using 13 
quarters of data ending with the quarter prior to the merger announcement; GTAa = the growth rate of the 
acquirer’s total assets over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement; GTAt = the growth rate of the 
target’s total assets over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement; Rel_asset = the target banking 
organization’s total assets divided by the sum of the target banking organization’s and the acquirer banking 
organization’s total assets; Instate = a binary variable that equals 1 if the target and acquirer are located in 
the same state, and 0 otherwise; Blockholder = binary variable for independent block ownership. It is equal 
to one if independent blocker ownership share is less than 5%, and zero otherwise; Indepdirectors = percent 
of board of directors that are not inside or grey directors; Years-To-Retire =65 minus the CEO’s age if the 
CEO is less than 65 or zero if the CEO is 65 or older; and HGolden = pre-merger change of control with 
target binary indicator variable that equals 1 if the target CEO has a change of control contract with the 
target firm, zero otherwise; CEO Share = target CEO’s percentage ownership of outstanding common 
shares; CEO  = 1 if the CEO becomes CEO of the new firm ; President = 1 if the CEO becomes president 
of the new firm; Other officer = 1 if the CEO assumes some other officer position in the new firm 
(typically CEO of a subsidiary);  Chairman = 1 if the CEO becomes chairman of the new firm; Vice-
Chair= 1 if the CEO becomes Vice-chairman of the new firm; Director = 1 if the CEO becomes a director 
of the new firm; Consult = 1 if the CEO becomes a consultant to the new firm.  The omitted variable for 
benefits from the new firm is None = binary variable that is equal to one if the target CEO does not obtain 
any position with the combined firm. Note, only the CEO’s highest position in the new company is 
recognized; for example a CEO that is also a president of the firm is coded as CEO=1, President=0. 
Numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates are t-statistics.  Annual fixed effects are also 
included in the estimation but are not reported.  The F-test for operating position tests the hypothesis that 
coefficients on CEO, President and Other Officer are zero.    The F-test for board role only tests the 
hypothesis that coefficients on Chairman, Vice-Chair, and Director are zero.  The t-statistics and F-
statistics are starred if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10 (*), 5(**), 
and 1 (***) percent level. 
 
 Purchase  Premium 
 20  Trading  Days 40  Trading  Days Abnormal  Returns 
Intercept  0.8075 ***  0.8216 ***  0.3768 *** 
  (3.23)   (3.03)   (2.92)  
ROAa  -12.81   -15.92   10.67  
  (-0.58)   (-0.66)   (0.93)  
ROAt  10.80   1.52   9.27  
  (0.55)   (0.07)   (0.91)  
VROAa  5874.38   4551.82   5197.33 ** 
    (1.43)   (1.02)   (2.46)  
VROAt  582.85   614.27   456.27  
  (0.38)   (0.37)   (0.58)  
COVt,a   -14.58 **  -12.99 *  -2.56  
  (-2.26)   (-1.86)   (-0.77)    35
Table 5. Estimation of Target Shareholder Returns, continuation 
 Purchase  Premium 
 20  Trading  Days 40  Trading  Days  Abnormal Returns 
GTAa  0.0156   0.0117   -0.0004  
  (1.58)   (1.10)   (-0.09)  
GTAt  0.0349   0.0470   0.0487  
  (0.57)   (0.71)   (1.55)  
Rel_asset  0.0018   -0.0065   -0.0300  
  (0.03)   (-0.10)   (-1.00)  
Instate    -0.0237   -0.0446   -0.0083  
  (-0.60)     (-1.04)   (-0.40)  
CEO shares  0.0013   0.0079   0.0003  
    (0.13)   (0.72)   (0.06)  
HGolden   -0.3868 ***  -0.3834 **  -0.2248 *** 
  (-2.71)   (-2.47)   (-3.05)  
Years to retire  0.0030   0.0039   0.0034 * 
  (0.81)   (0.96)   (1.76)  
Blockholder  0.1243 ***  0.0916 **  0.0511 ** 
  (3.20)   (2.17)   (2.55)  
Indepdirectors  0.0003   -0.0011   -0.0008  
  (0.20)   (-0.59)     (-0.99)  
CEO   -0.3734 ***  -0.3581 ***  -0.1202 * 
  (-3.00)   (-2.65)   (-1.87)  
President  -0.0575   -0.0743   0.0002  
  (-0.76)   (-0.91)   (0.00)  
Other officer   -0.1105 *  -0.1064 *  -0.0536 * 
  (-1.92)   (-1.70)     (-1.81)  
Chairman  -0.0432   -0.0101   0.0202  
  (-0.60)   (-0.13)   (0.54)  
Vice-Chair  -0.0543   -0.0650   -0.0021  
  (-0.85)   (-0.93)   (-0.06)  
Director   -0.1255 *  -0.1186   -0.0393  
  (-1.75)   (-1.52)   (-1.06)  
Consultant  -0.0638   -0.0995   0.0063  
  (-0.77)   (-1.11)   (0.15)  
          
Adjusted  R-Square  0.1704   0.1393   0.1366  
F-Statistic  for  Equation  1.94 ***  1.74 **  1.73 ** 
F-Statistic  for  Operating  position  3.45 **  2.67 *  2.11  
F-Statistic for Board Role Only  1.05    1.02    0.83   
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Table 6. Estimation of Acquirer, Combined and target announcement returns  
 
The three proxies for target shareholder returns are PREM20 = the premium of purchase price at the time of 
the announcement over the target’s share price 20 days before the announcement, PREM40 = the premium 
of purchase price at the time of the announcement over the target’s share price 40 days before the 
announcement, and T_Car = the target’s five-day cumulative abnormal returns over the [-2, +2] window.  
The independent variables are: ROAt = mean return on assets of target over the 13 quarters prior to the 
quarter of the merger announcement date; ROAa = mean return on assets of acquirer over the 13 quarters 
prior to the quarter of the merger announcement date; VROAt = the variance of the return on assets of the 
target using 13 quarters of data ending with the quarter prior to the merger announcement; VROAa = the 
variance of the return on assets of the acquirer using 13 quarters of data ending with the quarter prior to the 
merger announcement; COVt,a = the covariance of the target’s and acquirer’s return on assets using 13 
quarters of data ending with the quarter prior to the merger announcement; GTAa =  the growth rate of the 
acquirer’s total assets over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement; GTAt =  the growth rate of the 
target’s total assets over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement; Rel_asset = the target banking 
organization’s total assets divided by the sum of the target banking organization’s and the acquirer banking 
organization’s total assets; Instate = a binary variable that equals 1 if the target and acquirer are located in 
the same state, and 0 otherwise; Blockholder = binary variable for independent block ownership. It is equal 
to one if independent blocker ownership share is less than 5%, and zero otherwise; Indepdirectors = percent 
of board of directors that are not inside or grey directors; Years-To-Retire =65 minus the CEO’s age if the 
CEO is less than 65 or zero if the CEO is 65 or older; and HGolden = pre-merger change of control with 
target binary indicator variable that equals 1 if the target CEO has a change of control contract with the 
target firm, zero otherwise;CEO Share = target CEO’s percentage ownership of outstanding common 
shares; CEO = 1 if the CEO becomes CEO of the new firm ; President = 1 if the CEO becomes president 
of the new firm; Other officer = 1 if the CEO assumes some other officer position in the new firm 
(typically CEO of a subsidiary);  Chairman = 1 if the CEO becomes chairman of the new firm; Vice-
Chair= 1 if the CEO becomes Vice-chairman of the new firm; Director = 1 if the CEO becomes a director 
of the new firm; Consult = 1 if the CEO becomes a consultant to the new firm.  The omitted variable for 
benefits from the new firm is None = binary variable that is equal to one if the target CEO does not obtain 
any position with the combined firm. Note, only the CEO’s highest position in the new company is 
recognized; for example a CEO that is also a president of the firm is coded as CEO=1, President=0. 
Numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates are t-statistics.  Annual fixed effects are also 
included in the estimation but are not reported.  The F-test for operating position tests the hypothesis that 
coefficients on CEO, President and Other Officer are zero.    The F-test for board role only tests the 
hypothesis that coefficients on Chairman, Vice-Chair, and Director are zero.  The t-statistics and F-
statistics are starred if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10 (*), 5(**), 
and 1 (***) percent level. 
   
  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 Acquirer Combined Target 
Intercept  -0.0905   -0.0098   0.3768 *** 
  (-1.32)   (-0.16)   (2.92)   
ROAa  5.76   -0.8848   10.67  
  (0.95)   (-0.17)   (0.93)   
ROAt  -3.08   5.01   9.27  
  (-0.57)   (1.06)  0.91  ()   
VROAa  -1198.95   -33.07   5197.33 ** 
  (-1.07)   (-0.03)   (2.46)   
VROAt  312.92   414.05   456.27  
  0.75  ()   (1.13)   (0.58)   
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Table 6. Estimation of Acquirer, Combined and target announcement returns, continuation 
  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 Acquirer Combined Target 
COVt,a   0.8289   -1.71   -2.56  
 (0.47)    (-1.10)    (-0.77)   
GTAa  -0.0063 **  -0.0056 **  -0.0004  
 (-2.32)    (-2.36)    (-0.09)   
GTAt  0.0184   0.0247 *  0.0487  
 (1.10)    (1.69)    (1.55)   
Rel_asset  0.0243   0.0533 ***  -0.0300  
 (1.52)    (3.80)    (-1.00)   
Instate    0.0052   -0.0029   -0.0083  
 (0.48)      (-0.30)    (-0.40)   
CEO shares  -0.0025   -0.0029   0.0003  
 (-0.91)    (-1.19)    (0.06)   
HGolden   -0.0253   -0.0776 **  -0.2248 *** 
 (-0.64)    (-2.25)    (-3.05)   
Years to retire  0.0004   0.0012   0.0034 * 
 (0.39)    (1.32)    (1.76)   
Blockholder  -0.0038   0.0068   0.0511 ** 
 (-0.36)    (0.72)    (2.55)   
Indepdirectors  0.0005   0.0004   -0.0008  
 (1.11)    (0.96)    (-0.99)   
CEO   0.0027   -0.0282   -0.1202 * 
 (0.08)    (-0.94)    (-1.87)   
President  0.0157   0.0072   0.0002  
 (0.76)    (0.39)    (0.00)   
Other officer   0.0041   -0.0142   -0.0536 * 
 (0.26)    (-1.02)    (-1.81)   
Chairman  -0.0246   -0.0311 *  0.0202  
  (-1.24)   (-1.79)   (0.54)   
Vice-Chair  -0.0232   -0.0223   -0.0021  
 (-1.32)    (-1.44)    (-0.06)   
Director   0.0231   0.0055   -0.0393  
 (1.17)    (0.31)    (-1.06)   
Consultant  0.0324   0.0059   0.0063  
 (1.42)    (0.29)    (0.15)   
          
Adjusted  R-Square  0.0781   0.138   0.1366  
F-Statistic  for  Equation  1.39 *  1.74 **  1.73 ** 
F-Statistic  for  Operating  position  0.20   0.84   2.11  
F-Statistic for Board Role Only  2.50  *  2.00    0.83   
 